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CABLE TELEVISION UPDATE-CAPITAL CITIES CABLE, INC.
V. CRISP: FEDERALISM AND FRUSTRATION OF POWERS
The Supreme Court of the United States recently stunned the cable
television' industry with its decision in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp.2 The immediate result of the ruling was to preempt a state statute
prohibiting the advertisement of certain alcoholic beverages; however, the
decision's potential impact could be much broader.' The Court unanimously held cable television regulation to be the "exclusive domain" of
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and an "area that the
Commission has explicitly pre-empted."4 Thus, the decision extends
5
broad regulatory authority to the FCC at the expense of local control.
This comment presents an analysis of the recent Capital Cities decision and its impact upon local regulatory authority. More importantly,
consideration is given to the effect of this broad judicial statement on
both FCC and congressional power. It is suggested that the preemption
based Capital Cities opinion raises questions more of separation of powers than of federalism.
A thorough presentation of the historical development of cable regulation6 is not within the scope of this comment. 7 However, a short summary
1. A cable television (or CATV) system is defined by federal regulations as "[a] nonbroadcast facility consisting of a set of transmission paths and associated signal generation, reception, and control equipment, under common ownership and control, that distributes or is
designed to distribute to subscribers the signals of one or more television broadcast stations.
Cable Television Service, 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a) (1983).
2. 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
3. For initial public reaction to the decision, see Goodale & Bruce, Ruling Stuns Cable
Industry, 192 N.Y.L.J., July 13, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (describing the opinion as "unanimous and
far-reaching"); Pols Cable Television is Federal Matter: Supreme Court Rules FCC Has
Power to Regulate, Nation's Cities Weekly, June 25, 1984, at 5, col. 2 (suggesting that the
impact of the decision was much broader than the issue addressed).
4. 104 S. Ct. at 2703.
5. For the purposes of this comment, state and local regulation will be used interchangeably, as the Capital Cities decision is directed at and impacts upon both.

6. See generally G. CHRISTIANSEN, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CATV AND
(1977); M. HAMBERG, ALL ABOUT CABLE: LEGAL AND BUSINESS ASPECTS OF
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CABLE AND PAY

(rev. ed. 1981); Albert, The Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television,
48 U. COLO. L. REV. 501 (1977); Barnett, State, Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW 685 (1972); Barnett & Greenberg, A Proposal for Wired City
Television, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Harmon, Cable Television: A Changing Medium Raises
New Legal Issues, 13 GOLD. ST. U.L. REV. 123 (1983); Miner & Beals, Regulating Cable
Television, 57 WASH. L. REV. 85 (1981); Wheeler, Cable Television: Where It's Been, Where
It's Headed, 56 FLA. B.J. 228 (1981); Comment, The Collapse of Consensus:Effects of the
Deregulationof Cable Television, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 612 (1981); Comment, FCC Regulation
of Cable Television, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204 (1979); Note, The FCC's Cable Television JurisTELEVISION
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of that development is included for the purpose of clarifying the respective roles played by the FCC, Congress, and the courts.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND'

The Commission's Jurisdiction

The FCC initially denied that it possessed any regulatory authority
over cable television.9 However, early concerns regarding the impact of
unrestricted cable growth upon conventional television broadcasting 0
prompted the Commission to assume jurisdiction during the 1960's.11
diction: Deregulation by Judicial Fiat, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 718 (1978). See also Mallamud,
Courts, Statutes and Administrative Agency Jurisdiction:A Consideration of Limits on
Judicial Creativity, 35 S.C.L. REv. 191, 267 n.424 (1984).
7. Similarly, certain tangential issues will be left to other commentators. See, e.g., G. SHAPIRO, "CABLESPEECH:" THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION (1983); Hagelin, The
First Amendment Stake in New Technology: The Broadcast-CableControversy, 44 U. CiN.
L. REV. 427 (1975); Kreiss, Deregulation of Cable Television and the Problem of Access
Under the First Amendment, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1001 (1981); Stern, Krasnow & Serkowski,
The New Video Marketplace and the Search for a Coherent Regulatory Philosophy, 32
CATH. U.L. REV. 529 (1983); Comment, Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston: Local
Governments and Antitrust Immunity, 35 BAYLOR L. REv. 791 (1983); Note, The FCC's
Deregulationof Cable Television: The Problem of Unfair Competition and the 1976 Copyright Act, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591 (1982); Note, The Universal Copyright Convention and
the Problem of Community Antenna Television Systems, 3 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 535 (1975).
See also Growth of Media Will Alter Regulatory Scheme, 7 Legal Times, June 13, 1983, at
35 (summarizing the key issues arising in the 19 80's: privacy, content regulation, and copyright considerations).
8. For an extensive and updated history of cable television regulation, see Herbst, Matz &
Gibbs, A Review of Federal,State and Local Regulation of Cable Television in the United
States, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 377 (1984). See also Besen & Crandall, The Deregulation
of Cable Television, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 77 (Winter 1981); Shoenberger, The FCC,
Cable TV, and Visions of Valhalla:JudicialScrutiny of Complex Rulemaking and Institutional Competence, 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 113 (1979); Note, The Collapse of Consensus: Effects of the Deregulationof Cable Television, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1981).
9. See Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 255 (1958) (holding that
neither Title II nor IlI of the Communications Act of 1934 applied to CATV, stating that "it
appears doubtful to the Commission that any of those provisions may be fairly interpreted
to reach CATV systems"); First Report and Order, In re Inquiry Into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV "Satellite" Stations, and TV "Repeaters" on
the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403, 431 (1959) (concluding
that the FCC had "no present basis for asserting jurisdiction or authority over CATV's
.") [hereinafter cited as First Report and Order Inquiry].
10. See, e.g., First Report and Order Inquiry, supra note 9 at 423; In re Carter Mt.
Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 464 (1962) (grant of CATV facilities would have negative
impact upon existing TV station), afl'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951
(1963); First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 699-700 (1965) (expressing Commission policy
of favoring local broadcast service over cable). But see Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, 196 F. Supp. 315 (S.D. Idaho 1961) (ruling in favor of a
CATV system).
11. See In re Carter Mt. Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. at 465, 321 F.2d at 366; First
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This assumption of jurisdiction precipitated the view that cable was supplementary to basic broadcast service. 12 Only a few years after first exercising jurisdiction, the Commission promulgated an array of rules comprising a comprehensive regulatory scheme.' 3
B.

The Court's Standard of Review

Judicial affirmation of FCC authority was soon to follow, most notably
in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co."4 In that landmark decision,
the Supreme Court acknowledged cable television's supplementary status
by limiting the Commission's rulemaking authority to that "reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting."' 5 This "reasonably ancillary" standard would be the judicial yardstick of FCC authority for the next fifteen years.'8
C. Recent Deregulation
The 1970's witnessed an end to the regulatory freeze and a corresponding liberalization of the Commission's rules.' 7 FCC studies, which indicated that cable did not in fact harm local broadcasting, made heavy regReport and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965) (first comprehensive regulatory scheme). See also
Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 733-34 (1966) (concluding that "CATV systems
are engaged in interstate communication by wire to which the provisions of the Communications Act are applicable," though admitting that the jurisdiction question is "subject to reasonable difference of opinion"); Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1
F.C.C.2d 453, 563 (1965) (extending rules governing CATV systems using microwave to all
CATV systems).
12. See First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. at 706-07. See also Besen & Crandall, Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 86 (Winter 1981).
13. See, e.g., Second Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 816 (1970); First Report and Order,
20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d
417 (1968); Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966); First Report and Order, 38
F.C.C. 683 (1965).
14. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
15. Id. at 178.
16. See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708 (1979); United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 663 (1972); Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly, 573
F.2d 765, 767 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Comment, The FCC and Cable Information
Services: An Analysis of the Scope and Mandate of the CommunicationAct, 54 U. COLo. L.
Rxv. 257, 261 (1983) (interpreting the decisions as recognizing FCC authority to regulate
cable television "so long as the rules promote the objectives for which the FCC has been
given jurisdiction over broadcasting").
17."See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 47 C.F.R. § 76.1-.617 (1983)
(amended version currently regulates CATV). See also Report and Order, 66 F.C.C.2d 380
(1977); First Report and Order, 58 F.C.C.2d 442 (1976); Report and Order, 57 F.C.C.2d 68
(1976).
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ulation appear unjustified.' 8 No sooner had the Commission announced
its jurisdiction and escalated its regulation of cable, than a wide scale
9
elimination of restrictive rules was underway.'
Expedited by judicial invalidation of some rules, 20 the FCC accomplished a rapid deregulation of cable television at the federal level. Currently, FCC regulations consist of a more limited set of rules and standards, 21 leaving the cable industry with increased operational freedom
22
and growth, potential.
D.

Congressional Silence

Congress had taken no direct action regarding cable television regulation when the Capital Cities opinion was handed down. Invitations for
legislation had been extended by the FCC and implied by the courts. The
Commission recommended legislative action 23 and requested clarification
of its regulatory authority and jurisdictional responsibilities relative to
those of the states and localities. 24 The judiciary had expressed concern
over congressional inaction, suggesting that, given the "almost explosive
development" of cable television, the fundamental policies associated
with cable would be better addressed by Congress and not left entirely to
5
the FCC and the courts.2
18. See In re Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 71 F.C.C.2d 951,
966-67, 987-88 (1979).
19. See, e.g., Report and Order, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Malrite TV of
N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 71 F.C.C.2d 1004 (1979).
20. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708 (1979) (holding access rules not
"reasonably ancillary"); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 26 (1977) (holding "pay
cable" rules not "reasonably ancillary").
21. See Cable Television Services, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.1-.617 (1983).
22. One commentator described the deregulatory trend this way: "The FCC seems more
interested in eliminating rather than improving its rules, the courts appear reluctant to
challenge the Commission's painstaking decisions, and parties that believe themselves aggrieved will probably have to persuade Congress that what is really needed is-more regulation." Note, Recent Developments: FCC EliminatesLongstanding Cable TV Rules, 31 Am.
U.L. REv. 471, 475 (1982).
23. See First Report and Order, Inquiry, supra note 9, at 438, 441; First Report and
Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 685 (1965).
24. See Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 787 (1966). See also Besen & Crandall,
supra note 12, at 79 (stating that the FCC invited "Congress to clarify its authority. Congress never accepted this invitation, but the Commission proceeded to place a regulatory
yoke over cable operators nonetheless."); Note, Regulated Industries-FederalCommunications Commission-Supreme Court Invalidates Regulations Requiring Cable Broadcasters
to Provide Public Access-FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 13 CREGHTON L. REv. 1023, 1023
(1980) (describing the cable television area as "a regulatory nightmare to which Congress
has yet to respond.").
25. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 676 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 (1979) (authority to compel
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With the exception of unsuccessful bills and committee reports which
fell prey to the opposition of a strong cable lobby,2" the only time prior to
Capital Cities that Congress acted in a manner which affected cable television was in its revision of the Copyright Act of 1976.17 While that act
released cable operators from cumbersome negotiations with copyright
owners,28 it nevertheless constituted only an indirect legislative gesture
regarding cable regulation.29
In 1979, Congress responded to the deregulatory fever and the cry for a
national policy.2 However, the more recent legislative initiatives 31 were
seriously frustrated by the Capital Cities holding. Therefore, further
mention of current legislative
efforts will be made within the context of
32
the Capital Cities decision.

One commentator, recognizing the future judicial uncertainty in the
area of cable regulation, states that:
The problems, questions, and lack of predictability of the outcome of future
cases ...

exist because of the inability of Congress to determine if, and to

what extent, it wishes the cable industry to be regulated. This unwillingness
to take some affirmative action continues to work constrictions on the
courts, leaving them to base their decisions concerning the regulation of
cable on the legislative intent of an antiquated Communications Act. 33

cable operators to provide common carriage of public originated transmissions "must come
specifically from Congress"); United States v. Southwestern Cable TV, Inc., 392 U.S. 157,
170 n.31 (1968) (noting the Commission's 1966 request for legislation to "confirm [its]
jurisdiction").
26. See, e.g., H. R. REP. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. REP. No. 923, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959); STAFF OF SUBCOM. ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th CONG., 2d SEsS. -,
CABLE TELEVISION PROMISE VERSUS
REGULATORY PERFORMANCE (Comm. Print 1976) (report generally hostile to 1972 rules). See

also Herbst, Matz & Gibbs, supra note 8, at 382.
27. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). See also Shoenberger,
supra note 8, at 121 n.41.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (1982).
29. See generally Gorman, An Overview of the Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
856 (1978); Hatfield & Garrett, A Reexamination of Cable Television's Compulsory Licensing Royalty Rates: The Copyright Royalty Tribunal and the Marketplace, 30 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y 433 (1983). For criticism of the Act's provision of a compulsory license to cable, see
Oversight of the Copyright Act of 1976, Cable Television: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1981).
30. S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3333,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Amendments to the CommunicationsAct of 1934: Hearings on
S. 622 & 611 Before the Subcomm. on Communicationsof the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Amendments to the Communications Act of 1934: Hearings on H.R. 3333 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
31. S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 94-99.
33. Note, FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.: Public Access Teeteringon the Tightrope of FCC
Jurisdiction Over Cable Television, 16 IDAHO L. REV. 123, 139 (1979).
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II. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp
A.

Factual Setting

In 1980, the Oklahoma Attorney General determined that the state's
ban on alcoholic beverage advertisements applied to the retransmissions
by cable operators of out-of-state signals containing such advertisements.3 4 Responding to a warning by the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage
Control Board, operators of several cable systems filed suit, alleging that
the state ban violated the Supremacy Clause and the first amendment of
the United States Constitution. A federal district court granted summary
judgment for the cable operators on the grounds that the advertising prohibition was an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech. 35 On
appeal, that ruling was reversed.36 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
on the issue of whether application of the Oklahoma prohibition to outof-state broadcast
signals was valid, given existing federal regulation of
37
cable television.

B.

The Unanimous Opinion"s

After acknowledging that it does not "ordinarily consider questions not
specifically passed upon by the lower court,"3 9 the Supreme Court's opinion proceeds with an outline of the traditional Supremacy Clause framework of analysis. 4 The court cites authority to the effect that the preemption 41doctrine applies as much to federal regulations as to federal
statutes.
34. OKLA. CONST. art. XXVII, § 5; OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 37, § 516 (West Supp. 1984); Op.
Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 79-334 (Mar. 19, 1980).
35. Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, No. 81-439 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
36. 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983). It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeals did
not discuss whether application of the Oklahoma law was preempted by federal regulations.
The Court held the state ban to be a valid restriction on commercial speech in spite of the
first amendment protection afforded such commercials.
37. 104 S. Ct. 66 (1983).
38. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Brennan.
39. 104 S. Ct. 2694, 2699 (1984) (the Court adding that "this rule is not inflexible, particularly in cases coming, as this one does, from the federal courts.").
40. Our consideration . . . is guided by familiar and well-established principles. Under
the Supremacy Clause ... the enforcement of a state regulation may be pre-empted
by federal law in several circumstances: first, when Congress, in enacting a federal
statute, has expressed a clear intent to pre-empt state law ... second, when it is
clear, despite the absence of explicit pre-emptive language, that Congress has intended, by legislating comprehensively, to occupy an entire field of regulation and has
thereby "left no room for the States to supplement" federal law . . . and, finally,
when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible.
Id. at 2700 (citing Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2).
41. Id. (citing Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141
(1982)).
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Concerning the Commission's jurisdictional authority, the Court states
that the "power delegated to the FCC plainly comprises [the] authority to
'
regulate the signals carried by cable television systems."42
The Court then
concludes that "if the FCC has resolved to preempt an area of cable television regulation . . . all conflicting state regulations have been precluded. ' 43 The Court summarizes the regulatory history which, in its
view, demonstrates the Commission's preemptive intent. 44 In addition,
the Court takes care to note that the recent deregulatory trend is
designed to further the Commission's goal of "program diversity," and
should not be interpreted as an abdication of regulatory power by the
45

FCC.

The opinion makes the preemption of the challenged Oklahoma advertising law an easy judicial task, finding the law to be an invalid exercise of
state authority on several grounds.46 First, by asserting that the state ban
would restrict the ability of cable operators to fulfill the FCC objective of
program diversity, the Court concludes that "to the extent it has been
invoked to control the distant broadcast and nonbroadcast signals imported by cable operators, the Oklahoma advertising ban plainly reaches
beyond the regulatory authority reserved to local authorities by the Com'47
mission's rules, and trespasses into the exclusive domain of the FCC.
The Court takes a more direct stand when it finds that the Oklahoma
advertising ban "plainly conflicts with specific federal regulations. '4s The
42. Id. at 2700-01 (citing United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968);
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982)).
43. Id. at 2701. At this point, the Court dispenses with the first amendment issue on the
grounds that the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board lacked standing to raise such
a claim. Id. at 2701 n.6.
44. Id. at 2701-02.
45. Id. at 2703.
46. The preemption doctrine had previously been applied to cable regulation by a lower
court. See Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly, 428 F. Supp. 1216 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), afl'd,
573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979). But see NARC v. FCC, 533
F.2d 601, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (invalidating the Commission's preemption of state regulation, holding that the Communications Act did not confer "blanket jurisdiction" on the FCC
and that the nonbroadcast activities at issue were within the proper scope of local
authority).
47. 104 S. Ct. at 2703.
48. Id. Here, the Court refers to the FCC's "must-carry" rules governing certain local
broadcasting, as well as to its encouragement of the importation of out-of-state signals, all of
which are required to be carried "in full, without deletion or alternation of any portion."
See 47 C.R §§ 76.55(b), 76.59(a)(1), 76.59(a)(1)(b) (1983). In addition, the Court finds a
conflict between the Oklahoma law and "specialized nonbroadcast services" exemplified by
such national programming as the Cable News Network (CNN) and the Entertainment
Sports Programming Network (ESPN). Noting that such services are characterized by an
absence of advanced notice concerning the content of commercials, the Court suggests that
deleting advertisements prior to retransmission would be a "prohibitively burdensome
task," and the consequences would be "wholly at odds" with the Commission's objective of
program diversity. Id. at 2705.
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preemption analysis concludes with the observation that Congress recognized the policy of encouraging the importation of out-of-state signals
through its Copyright Revision Act of 1976.19 The Court emphasized a
provision of that act which requires cable operators to "refrain from deleting or altering commercial advertising .. .-.
The final section of the opinion is devoted to overcoming the most formidable obstacle faced by the Court. The twenty-first amendment grants
broad power to the states to regulate liquor traffic within their borders.51
Nevertheless, the Court reasons that "the Amendment does not license
the States to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the Constitution."52 Recognizing that "the Federal government plainly retains authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate even interstate commerce
in liquor, '53 the Court proceeds to employ a test which balances the federal interest in providing a diversity of cable services to the public against
the state's interest in discouraging the consumption of intoxicating liquor.5 4 Noting that the Oklahoma law excludes the advertising of beer on
television as well as in newspapers and magazines, the Court concludes
that this "narrow" state ban "engages only indirectly the central power"
reserved by the twenty-first amendment. 5 Thus, by finding the state's
interest to be "limited" and the "federal objective of ensuring widespread
availability of diverse cable services" to be significant," the Court reaches
the conclusion that not even the twenty-first amendment saves the
57
Oklahoma ban from the fate of federal preemption.
III.
A.

THE COURT'S MESSAGE FOR MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY

Broad Language
The Capital Cities decision employs extremely broad language, refer-

49. Id. at 2705 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
50. Id. at 2706 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(3) (1982)).
51. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § 2.
52. 104 S. Ct. at 2707.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2708.
55. Id. at 2709. The Court considers this "central power" to include the importation or
sale of liquor as well as the structure of the distribution system. Id.
56. Id.
57. [W]e hold that when, as here, a state regulation squarely conflicts with the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of federal law, and the state's central
power under the Twenty-first Amendment of regulating the times, places, and manner under which liquor may be imported and sold is not directly implicated, the balance between state and federal power tips decisively in favor of the federal law, and
enforcement of the state statute is barred by the Supremacy Clause.
Id. See also California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980) (state wine pricing scheme constituted a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act).
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ring to the FCC's "general authority under the Communications Act to
regulate cable television systems."58 This represents an important departure from earlier decisions which had limited the Commission's authority
to that "reasonably ancillary" to the regulation of television broadcasting.5 9 As one commentator asserts:
[U]ntil Capital Cities, the FCC had to show that its regulation of cable was
designed to protect or promote its objectives and policies with respect to
broadcasting, as to which the Commission had undisputed authority. Suddenly, it seemed as if the 'ancillary to broadcasting' restriction on the FCC's
jurisdiction to regulate cable had simply vanished.60
The Court does not stop at mere expansion of FCC jurisdiction, but proceeds to strengthen the Commission's preemptive muscle. Indeed, the
Court appears to leave FCC authority virtually unrestricted by local
power when it finds that the Commission "has unambiguously expressed
its intent to pre-empt any state or local regulation of this entire array of
signals carried by cable television systems."' Thus, the practical message
of Capital Cities is that FCC regulatory authority has been completely
6
unleashed at the expense of local control. 2
B. Local Authority-Then and Now
Traditionally, municipalities exercised control over the "local incidents" of cable through the process of granting franchises. 3 In fact,
"cable's very technology-involving the laying of lines, conduits, and
cables throughout a given community-in most cases automatically trig'
gers the involvement of the local governmental entity."64
Most states provide for local control through statutes authorizing franchise grants.65
58. 104 S. Ct. at 2702. Elsewhere, the Court describes this authority as "comprehensive."
Id. at 2701.
59. See supra notes 14-16.
60. Goodale & Bruce, supra note 3, at 4, col. 1.
61. 104 S. Ct. at 2701. But see In re Community Cable TV, Inc., 95 F.C.C.2d 1204 (1983)
(noting that a locality may, in certain instances, regulate the rates of local broadcasting

signals).
62. Capital Cities is not the first decision in which local cable regulation experienced a
setback. See Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982)
(holding that municipalities enjoy no immunity from federal antitrust laws). See also Mar-

ticorena, Municipal Cable Television Regulation: Is There Life After Boulder? 9 W. ST.
U.L. REV. (1982).
63. See Note, The Evaluation of Cable Television Regulation: A ProposalFor the Future, 21 URB.L. ANN.179, 204 (1981). See also TV PIX, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459, 463
(D. Nev. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 396 U.S. 556 (1970) (upholding a state statute on the
grounds that cable television was primarily a "local business"); Barnett, State, Federal,and
Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NOTRE D m LAW. 685, 685-86 (1972).
64. Albert, The Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U. COLO. L. REV.
501, 508 (1977).

65. Id. at 509.
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Such statutes find their justification in the traditional local power to regulate streets and ways, as well as in the police power to protect health,
safety, and property.6
Even after the FCC assumed regulation of cable television, state and
local governments continued to play a significant regulatory role. 7 One
authority recently maintained that "[flederal regulation of cable television is nonexclusive and state authority to regulate cable is not in question. ' 68 Certainly, the deregulation of cable at the federal level has been a
factor in the continued development of local power.6 9 The primary focus
of local control is on the franchising process; 70 nevertheless, local control
is checked by FCC guidelines and standards.1 Still, the Commission has
consistently recognized the legitimacy of municipal authority. 2 As a result of both Congress' failure to clarify FCC jurisdiction and the cable
industry's subjection to regulation on three governmental levels, the federal-local regulatory relationship has been a confusing one.7 3 Prior to
Capital Cities, however, one could be certain that local government
played an integral part in cable television's regulatory maze.74
66. Id. See also Note, supra note 63, at 185 (recognizing that "[c]able operators cannot
construct their systems without governmental permission to use local thoroughfares").
67. See Noam, Towards An Integrated Communications Market: Overcoming the Local
Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. CoM. L.J. 209, 230-31 (1982) ("Because cable is
franchised largely on a local basis, local governments have become a logical locus of regulation, both by setting conditions in their franchise contracts and by the continued supervision of the contract's fulfillment.").
68. Herbst, Matz &'Gibbs, supra note 8, at 396.
69. See id.; Marticorena, supra note 62, at 114 (stating that "the FCC has gradually withdrawn jurisdiciton in this area and allowed, by negative implication, increased local control
over cable television.").
70. See Noam, supra note 67, at 230-31. For the position that "[s]ince local governments
are the most attuned governmental bodies to community needs and desires, their input into
the franchising process is crucial," see Note, supra note 63, at 207.
71. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1983). See also Herbst, Matz & Gibbs, supra note 8, at 406.
72. See In re Amendment of Subparts B and C of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules
Pertaining to Applications for Certificates of Compliance and Federal-State/Local Regulatory Relationships, 66 F.C.C.2d 380, 391 (1977), aff'd in relevant part, 71 F.C.C.2d 569, 571
(1979); Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 207 (1972). See also Herbst,
Matz & Gibbs, supra note 8, at 388 (noting that in its 1972 Rules, the Commission recognized that "local governments must be intimately involved since cable uses streets and public ways"); Comment, Hit or Myth?: The Cable TV Marketplace,Diversity and Regulation,
35 FED. CoM. L.J. 41, 45-46 (explaining that the FCC relaxed its franchising rules in 1977
"because the FCC felt local officials, not the federal government, could best judge what is
required"); Note, supra note 63, at 198 n.125 (noting the FCC's conclusion that "cities were
the proper regulatory agents of cable television"); Id. at 200 ("The Commission reasoned
that since local authorities must enforce the regulations imposed upon cable operators, they
should create them. Further, after six years of experience, local governments were 'more
sophisticated in regulatory matters.' ") (citation omitted).
73. Note, supra note 63, at 181 n.8.
74. A discussion of the relative merits of local control exceeds the scope of this comment.
See generally Davis, Cable Television Franchising-TheRole of Local Governments, 51
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Capital Cities appears to have a serious impact on local regulation of
cable.7 5 In the decision, the Court concludes that the FCC preempts "any
state or local regulation of th[e] entire array of signals carried by cable
television systems. 17 6 Even more critical is the effect which the decision
may have on the regulatory leverage provided local authorities by their
franchisor status:
Capital Cities also calls into question the increasingly common practice
whereby local governments use their franchising powers to force cable operators to put or retain satellite-delivered services in the basic service package, and so to keep
or put such services within the regulatory power of these
77
local authorities.
In spite of the Court's suggestion that localities may "regulate such local
aspects of cable systems as franchise selection and construction oversight, 17 8 the overall broad language of the opinion makes challenges to a
wide range of local regulations conceivable.7 9
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the Capital Cities opinion is
its suggestion that the powers retained by states and localities were somehow delegated to them at the Commission's discretion. 0 The Court
states:
In marking the boundaries of its jurisdiction, the FCC determined that, in
contrast to its regulatory scheme for television broadcasting stations, it
would not adopt a system of direct federal licensing for cable systems. Instead, the Commission announced a program of 'deliberately structured dualism' in which state and local authorities were given responsibility for
granting franchises to cable operators within their communities and for
overseeing such local incidents of cable operations as delineating franchise
areas, regulating the construction of cable facilities, and maintaining rights
FLA. B.J. 78 (1977); Comment, Community Antenna Television: The Case for Municipal
Control, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 99 (1975); Note, Cable Television: The PracticalImplicationsof

Local Regulation and Control, 27 DRAKE L. REv. 391 (1978).
75. 104 S. Ct. at 2701 (emphasis added). See supra note 61 and accompanying text. For
example, one commentator observes that "[m]ore than simply affirming the FCC's authority
...the Capital Cities opinion seems to suggest that any other attempt by local authorities
to regulate satellite-delivered programming would be pre-empted by the FCC."
76. Goodale & Bruce, supra note 3, at 4, col. 2.
77. Id. See also Freeman, Supreme Court Backs Cable in OK Liquor Ad Ban Case, 5
Multichannel News, June 25, 1984, at 35, col. 5 (observing that "another issue which might
be tested is any municipal franchising rule which requires cable operators to carry certain
channels on basic rather than tiering channels"); Pols, supra note 3, at 5, col. 1 (stating that
Capital Cities makes "the validity of local franchise requirements which relate to the programming provided over the cable system... questionable").
78. 104 S. Ct. at 2703.
79. See Freeman, supra note 77, at 35, col. 5.
80. See 104 S. Ct. at 2703 (in which the Court referred to "the regulatory authority reserved to local authorities by the Commission's rules") (emphasis added).
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By characterizing the FCC as having "given responsibility" for operational concerns to localities while retaining responsibility for non-operational matters itself, the Court would appear to leave local governments
free to "exercise whatever authority they have over cable at the grace of
the FCC.""2 Arguably, the jurisdictional and preemptive authority
8 3
granted to the Commission by the Court would seem to be unlimited.
IV.
A.

JUDICIAL

INFLUENCE UPON THE OTHER

FEDERAL

BRANCHES

The Commission Follows Suit

The CapitalCities decision is a most welcome one from the perspective
of the FCC. To begin with, it represents judicial reaffirmation of an otherwise tenuous basis for jurisdictional authority-the Communications Act
of 1934.84 Judicial reliance on this act as the legislative grant of FCC authority over cable has been consistently criticized. 5 But the more significant effect of Capital Cities is the fact that it gives the Commission new
regulatory momentum-momentum on which it has already capitalized.

81. 104 S. Ct. at 2702 (citing Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 207
(1983)) (emphasis added).
82. Goodale & Bruce, supra note 3, at 4, col. 1. See also Pols, supra note 3, at 5, col. 2
(stating that the Court "characterized the present state and local regulatory role as having
been delegated to states and localities through FCC actions").
83. For the view that the opinion included no indication of any limits on the FCC's jurisdiction, see Nation's Cities, supra note 3, at 5, col. 1. See also Freeman, supra note 77, at
35, col. 5 (calling Capital Cities "a very important case with implications reaching across
the whole spectrum of regulation of cable by state and local governments").
84. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982) ("The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate
and foreign communication by wire or radio . . ").
85. See, e.g., Comment, FCC Regulation of Cable Television, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204, 215
(1979) (suggesting that the 1934 Act neither grants authority nor embodies any congressional intent regarding cable).
Ultimately, Congress must shoulder the responsibility for the confusion over cable
television in the national scheme of communications regulation. The Communications
Act, which verges on obsolescence, has not been significantly revised since 1934. By
abdicating the field, Congress has forced the FCC and the courts to deal with this
dynamic industry in what is essentially a standardless vacuum.
Id. at 235-36.
Congress has not significantly revised the Communications Act of 1934. Courts and
the FCC, therefore, have rendered their decisions concerning the cable industry without having prescribed standards to rely on. Authorities have stretched and strained
the Communications Act to cover the many technological developments in the communications field.
Note, supra note 63, at 203. See also Note, supra note 33. For an excellent discussion of
Congress' delegation of preemptive authority to federal agencies, see 21 DUQ. L. REv. 1087
(1983). See also Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectiveson Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975).
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In In re Community Cable TV, Inc.,"s the FCC took full advantage of
the Supreme Court's expansive language in an attempt to settle once and
for all the uncertainty surrounding its preemptive authority.8s The ruling
states: "It is evident that petitioners have fundamentally misconstrued
the thrust of our prior decision. As the United States Supreme Court
most recently recognized in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, . . . our
policy in this field has been explicit and settled for two decades. '18 Again
borrowing from Capital Cities, the Commission concludes that "[s]tate
regulation of these services, as the Supreme Court has recently noted, 'is
completely precluded by federal law.' "89
At one point, the Commission appears to concede that the scope of its
authority has not always been so explicitly defined when it states that
"policies in this area [have] evolved through a step-by-step process
....
"90 Nevertheless, the Commission concludes its ruling with a retreat
to the Capital Cities opinion: "We believe that our policy of preemption
is both reasonable and in harmony with our desire to assure continued
diversity of programming for the viewing public."'"
The practical effect of Community Cable is to preempt all local
franchise provisions purporting to regulate the content or placement of
broadcast signals.9 2 Thus, the ruling erodes the ability of local governments to exercise regulatory authority through the imposition of specific
franchise requirements. Indeed, the decision undermines what was previously local government's most effective regulatory weapon-the cable
franchising process. Finally, an inference can be drawn from this FCC
ruling and its exclusion of any reference to congressional policy: the Commission views its preemptive authority as having been granted by the
93
Court, rather than by Congress.
86. F.C.C. No. 84-331 (July 25, 1984), 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 735 (1984).
87. The Community Cable ruling concerned in particular the FCC's preemption of
"nonbasic services" (those not regularly provided to all subscribers). The effect of the ruling
is to preempt rate regulation by franchising localities of these "nonbasic services" regardless
of how cable operators choose to "tier" their services. 56 RAn. REG. 2d (P&F) at 740-42.
88. 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) at 739.
89. Id. at 740.
90. Id. at 741-42 (citing 66 F.C.C.2d 380, 402 n.21 (1977)).
91. Id. at 742 (referring to Capital Cities).
92. Pols, FCC Stands Fast, Implements Cable Rules, Nation's Cities Weekly, July 30,

1984, at 7, col. 4. While the effect of Capital Cities is uncertain, "[tihe FCC's ruling is
expected to have a wide ranging impact on franchises throughout the country, virtually all

of which include provisions which are in direct conflict with the FCC's policies as established in the Community Cable TV, Inc. case." Id.
93. Interestingly enough, the Commission chose to include recognition of current congressional initiative in a footnote:
Although the pleadings before us today touch on issues which are also being and have
recently been considered by Congress,. . . our result today is based specifically upon
prior Commission decisions, and is not meant to express a view as to the merits or
desirability of any proposed legislation.
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Frustrationof CongressionalCompromise

Just two weeks prior to the Supreme Court's Capital Cities decision,
the National League of Cities (NLC) and the National Cable Television
Association (NCTA) reached agreement on a compromise deregulation
bill then before the House.9 4 The bill was a proposed amendment to the
Communications Act of 1934 and provided guidelines for the exercise of
both FCC and local authority with respect to cable television regulation.9
For purposes of this discussion, it is important to note that the bill
clearly left more authority to localities than the broad Capital Cities
ruling.9 6
Although the NCTA initially approved the pending bill, it suddenly
withdrew its support in reaction to the Court's broad opinion and the
subsequent FCC ruling.9 7 Indeed, as Capital Cities and Community
Cable gave the cable industry far more authority than was expected from
the legislative process, the NCTA took the position that it would support
only a bill which more accurately reflected these recent decisions.9 Not
surprisingly, the decisions had the opposite effect on the NLC, turning
the NLC's initial criticism of the bill into sudden enthusiasm for passage.
However, in light of Capital Cities and the NCTA walkout which that
56 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) at 741 n.12 (referring to H.R. 4103, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984)).
94. H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The Senate had passed a comparable bill in
the previous session. S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See also Karr, Cable TV Industry,
Cities Compromise on DeregulationBill, Wall St. J., June 1, 1984, at 45, col. 3; NLC Board
Approves Cable Compromise, Nation's Cities Weekly, June 18, 1984, at 1, col. 3; Cable TV
Pact Clears House Panel, Nation's Cities Weekly, July 2, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (summarizing
H.R. 4103's major provisions).
95. For a discussion of the initial positions of the NCL and the NCTA, see Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the
Comm. on Energy and Commerce on H.R. 4103 and H.R. 4229 (Bills to Amend the Communications Act of 1934 to Provide a National Policy Regarding Cable Television) and H.R.
4299 (A Bill to Amend the Communications Act of 1934 to Establish a National Cable
Communications Policy Which GuaranteesLocal JurisdictionalAuthority Over Franchises
While Encouraging Competition, and For Other Purposes), 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
96. See Trice, Cable Wars, CAL. LAW, July 1984, at 54, 55 (stating that the bill "gives
primary jurisdiction over cable to the FCC, while recognizing the cities' authority to grant
local franchises"); Arthurs, Rulings Complicate Cable Legal Picture, Legal Times, Aug. 20,
1984, at 1, col, 4 (the legislative compromise "would have given cities statutory powers to
regulate rates"); Crook, Cable Industry Looking for Some Law and Order,L.A. Times, June
5, 1984, § 6, at 1, col. 1 (quoting Paul E. Zeltner, member of negotiating team for NLC and
the U.S. Conference of Mayors, as saying that the "agreement preserves local authority over
cable franchises").
97. See Pols, Cable Bill Essential This Year-Cities Urged to Push Passage, Nation's
Cities Weekly, Aug. 20, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
98. See Isikoff, Firms Ask Changes in Cable Bill: Say Legislation Must Reflect FCC,
Court Decisions, Wash. Post, July 18, 1984, at D1, col. 6. See also Nation's Cities Weekly,
Aug. 20, 1984, at 6, col. 1 (noting that, without H.R. 4103, the trend in FCC decisions such
as Community Cable would eventually destroy all local control over the franchising
process).
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decision eventually precipitated, the legislative process was delayed and
the compromise bill was given virtually no chance of success. 9
V.

CONCLUSION

The future impact of Capital Cities is as yet uncertain. For now it
should be noted as a judicial statement which employs language much
broader than the issue addressed. From a factual setting expected by
many to be decided on first amendment grounds, the Court abandons its
"reasonably ancillary" standard and places local regulation of cable television at the mercy of the FCC. 100 To accomplish this, the Court reaffirms
a tenuous basis for FCC jurisdiction'10 1 and rejects-a strong twenty-first
amendment claim. 1 2
While on its face Capital Cities reads like a lecture on the concepts of
federalism, one might be more disturbed by the decision's implications
for separation of powers. Although the legislative basis for FCC authority
over cable television has been questioned, the Court proceeds to expand
0 3
this authority on the basis of the Commission'sown preemptive intent.
Thus, with no more than copyright legislation to consult as an indication
of congressional policy, the Court essentially delegates regulatory authority to the Commission. 0 4 In the absence of any congressional guidance,
this judicial grant of power has been enthusiastically exercised by the
05
FCC as evidenced by Community Cable.1
Capital Cities is an example of broad judicial decisionmaking which
ignores current legislative history. Arguably, the Court had waited long
enough for Congress to act. However, by expanding the Commission's
preemptive authority beyond prior judicial limits and leaving future municipal regulatory power at the discretion of the FCC, 0 6 the Court greatly
enhanced the cable industry's lobbying position. As a result, the product
of four years of legislative negotiations-a compromise deregulation
bill-was jeopardized.
As a practical matter, Capital Cities represents a victory for the FCC
99. See Goodale & Bruce, supra note 3, at 4, col. 3 (suggesting that Capital Cities may
have "sounded the death knell for the compromise bill"); Arthurs, supra note 96, at 4, col. 3.
("The recent Supreme Court and FCC rulings have made that compromise less attractive to
cable operators,

. . .

and for the moment the deal is off.").

100. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
101. See supra note 85.
102. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
103. See supra text accompanying note 61.
104. For an excellent analysis of such "judicial delegation" using FCC regulation of cable
television as an illustration, see Mallamud, Courts, Statutes and Administrative Agency
Jurisdiction:A Considerationof Limits on Judicial Creativity, 35 S.C.L. REv.191 (1984).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 84-93.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
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and the cable industry, which are left in a better position to continue
their partnership toward the complete deregulation of cable television. In
addition, the decision constitutes a judicial "frustration of powers," having an obvious impact upon both regulatory and legislative posture.
As this comment was completed, Congress closed its second session of
1984 with the unexpected passage of a cable deregulation bill thought to
be in its final hour. 10 7 This action does not, however, alter the conclusion
that Capital Cities constitutes a judicial "frustration of powers." In fact,
the successful bill reflects recent House amendments which place further
restrictions on local power.' 08 Thus, to the discontent of supporters of
municipal authority, Congress has to a certain extent incorporated the
Court's broad statement into law.
Admittedly, however, the legislation does limit the otherwise broad
scope of Capital Cities. Senate debate included specific reference to the
decision' 0 9 and made it clear that a particular provision of the bill preserves the validity of state and local obscenity laws:
Section 638 makes it clear that nothing in this measure is to be interpreted
as granting exclusive authority for regulating cable television content to the
FCC. Rather, States and localities retain any authority which they would
have in this area if the Communications Act of 1934 had never been
enacted." 0
Only time will reveal the extent to which this long-awaited cable legislation limits Capital Cities and preserves a legitimate role for municipality
authority.
Steven J. Keeler

107. Cable Franchise Policy and Communications Act of 1984, S. 66, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,
130 CONG. REc. 14,289-97 (1984); Telephone interview with Ruth Minetto, Cable Television
Information Center, Alexandria, Virginia (Oct. 18, 1984). See also Congress Limits Local
Control of Cable TV, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1984, at A15, col. 1; Bill on Cable TV Policy is
Sent to White House, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct. 12, 1984, at A6, col. 1.
108. In particular, an amendment to H.R. 4103 reduced the "grandfathering" period for
local rate regulation from four to two years following the effective date of the legislation. 130
CONG. REc. S14286 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). Also, franchise renewal was simplified for cable
olerators by an amendment which placed a heavier burden on local authorities to show that
a franchise should not be renewed prior to commencement of the administrative proceedings. Id.
109. 130 CoNG. REc. S14289 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Trible).
110. Id. (statement of Sen. Goldwater); H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 638 (1984).

